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Neuropsychology: Reflections on mirror images
Vincent Walsh
About half of the readers of this article would not be able
to tell whether a picture of the Mona Lisa is correct or
mirror-reversed. Neuropsychological studies may help
explain this striking dissociation between the ability to
identify images and memory for their handedness.
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A recent advertising campaign ran a picture of eight copies
of the Mona Lisa. In four of them she faced left, as in
Figure 1, and in the other four she faced to her right. All
but two of them had a detail changed: for example, which
hand crossed on top. The slogan with the advert ran “Don’t
mistake familiarity for knowledge”. Anyone looking at the
advert would be sure the picture was the Mona Lisa, but
despite this familiarity with the image, it was difficult to say
which was the correct one. It appears, then, that we can
represent the identity of an image in memory indepen-
dently of its handedness. This goes to the heart of one of
the central questions of computational theories of object
recognition: does the representation of an object depend on
the viewpoint from which it is seen, or is there a stage of
processing at which the orientation or handedness of the
object is irrelevant? And if object representation can be
independent of viewpoint, how does the visual system dis-
criminate enantiomorphs — lateral mirror images — such
as those shown in Figure 2a?
Enantiomorphs present a special case of image discrim-
ination, because we have to discriminate between them
only under special conditions — for example, while learn-
ing to read, when the difference between d and b is
important, or in mathematics, when < and> have different
meanings. However, these special cases, which have been
overlearned through years of schooling, have not revealed
how the brain registers the handedness of an image in
those cases where reversing the handedness does alter the
image’s identity — for example, the piano in Figure 2a is
still a piano in a way that b is not d. In the past hundred
years or so, human neuropsychology has unearthed many
specific and surprising deficits caused by brain damage.
Damage to different regions of the visual system can lead
to perceptual difficulties restricted, for example, to motion
or colour or faces. In a recent paper, Turnbull and
McCarthy [1] add to this list of deficits a case of enan-
tiomorphic blindness — a patient who cannot tell the
difference between two mirror images (see Fig. 2).
Turnbull and McCarthy [1] studied a patient, RJ, who had
bilateral damage to the parietal lobes and was unable to
say which of the three images in Figure 2a is the odd one
out. He was, however, perfectly able to identify pictures
and objects, could read and could detect the odd one out
from Figures 2b and 2c. Note that the discrimination in
Figure 2c is more difficult than the enantiomorphy dis-
crimination failed by RJ. He was also sensitive to the ori-
entation of words, distinguishing HOT from TOH, LEFT
from TFEL, and RIGHT from . His deficit was
therefore specific to lateral mirror images of objects. In a
previous paper [2], the same authors described another
patient, LJ, who had an impairment specific to the canoni-
cal orientation of objects. This patient could recognize and
name objects, but if presented with a rotated version of a
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Figure 1
The Mona Lisa — but is she facing the right way?
picture (as in Fig. 2b, bottom), she was unable to rotate it
to its correct orientation.
At first sight, these findings might seem to support
theories of object recognition that invoke viewpoint-
independent representations of objects in the brain [3,4].
As Turnbull and McCarthy [1] point out, however, RJ’s
ability to discriminate large rotation differences (Fig. 2b)
is not consistent with access to a viewpoint-independent
representation in the absence of viewpoint-dependent
information. If RJ had access only to viewpoint-indepen-
dent representations then he should have been as blind to
orientation differences as he was to mirror-reflections.
This was not the case, however, and RJ was able to dis-
criminate orientation differences such as that illustrated in
Figure 2b. Turnbull and McCarthy [1] argue that RJ’s
failure to discriminate enantiomorphs was due to an
inability to compare stored representations of objects with
an egocentric frame of reference — that is, with respect to
his own body.
Some evidence from animal studies can be interpreted as
supporting Turnbull and McCarthy’s hypothesis. Monkeys
with parietal cortex lesions cannot discriminate mirror
images [5], and they are unimpaired on tests of egocentric
spatial representation [6–8]. In other words, an enan-
tiomorph-blind monkey can tell its own left from right, but
not whether an object faces left or right. But this does not
constitute evidence that any comparison is made between
the object representation and one’s own left or right. Fur-
thermore, it also does not explain RJ’s ability to discrimi-
nate the stimuli in Figure 2b. The parietal cortex has long
been implicated in body-centred spatial processing, but
there are other kinds of spatial computation performed by
the parietal cortex that may also be interesting in the
context of solving mirror-image discriminations.
The pattern of impairments in these patients and
lesioned monkeys suggests that the parietal visual areas
form an important part of the object processing system.
This is something to which lip-service has been paid for
many years, but studies of the physiology of higher level
vision still tend to concentrate on inferior temporal
cortex. There are old and deep foundations on which to
build a theory of how parietal cortex contributes to the
analysis of visually presented objects [5,9]. Indeed, visual
representation in the temporal lobe is of limited use
without intact parietal cortex, which mediates the visuo-
motor transformations that allow one to interact with
objects [10].
Mirror images have a special status in the visual world.
Infants of 3–4 months are able to discriminate between
different orientations — such as versus — but not
enantiomorphs — such as versus [11]. Older chil-
dren, between the ages of 4 and 9 years, also find it more
difficult to learn to discriminate lateral mirror images than
any spatial transformations [12]. Other species — for
example, fish, octopus, rodents and monkeys — are also
easily confused by mirror images [13]. It is, of course, diffi-
cult to think of many ways in which one could confuse
adult subjects with mirror images, and this is usually inves-
tigated using mental rotation tasks in which subjects are
asked to state whether two views of an object are reflected
(as in Fig. 2a) or rotated (as in Fig. 2b). These studies have
led to the suggestion that, under some conditions, rotation
through 180 degrees (Fig. 2b) and reflection (Fig. 2a) may
involve some similar aspects of visual processing [14]. Here
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Figure 2
(a) An enantiomorph discrimination. These
three objects are identical but for the fact that
one is a lateral mirror reflection of the others.
RJ was unable to make this kind of
discrimination. (b) Vertical discrimination.
These three objects are identical but for the
fact that one is a vertical reflection of the
others. RJ was able to make this kind of
discrimination. (c) Feature discrimination. The
odd one out differs in a subtle way. RJ was
able to make this kind of discrimination.
again, however, the dissociation between RJ’s ability to
detect rotation or reflection differences suggests we may
need to think again.
How does this special nature of reflected objects arise? If
one thinks within a framework of view-dependent versus
view-independent processes, then handedness-free repre-
sentations in memory may appear as an achievement of
the visual system (two views of an object being encoded as
one). An alternative view is that handedness-free repre-
sentations are not so much an achievement of the visual
system as the inevitable result of the importance of sym-
metry in the real world — wherever mirror images occur,
they are likely to do so because they form two halves of
the same object. In this vein, Gross and Bornstein [13]
argue that “the confusion of mirror images is not a ‘confu-
sion’ but an adaptive mode of processing visual informa-
tion. In the natural world, the only mirror images that ever
occur are aspects of the same thing and therefore need not
be distinguished. Rather, it is adaptive to treat enan-
tiomorphs as equivalent to each other. Rather than the
confusion of mirror images we can speak of their percep-
tual equivalence”. One may even go further and speak of
their ‘behavioural equivalence’: the direction in which one
is looking may matter to social animals, but to most
species, social or not, the direction in which something is
facing may only have meaning when it is accompanied by
movement. It would be interesting to know, therefore,
whether patients with RJ’s deficits have normal motion
perception and can make direction discriminations based
on motion.
Here, then, we have a framework for understanding the
deficits shown by RJ. The visual system begins life unable
to distinguish lateral mirror images. As occasion arises to
do so, the visual system needs to generate a strategy with
which to manipulate and compare lateral mirror images,
for example in reading and mathematics, where differ-
ences between d and b, < and >, and Z and N are impor-
tant. The ability to carry out spatial computations on
visual images is probably dependent on parietal cortex.
We need not postulate something akin to a ‘mirror-image
module’, but it seems reasonable to propose that the
normal mechanisms in parietal cortex can be used to con-
tribute to very complex visual object processing. 
One might wonder how RJ’s ability to discriminate mirror
reversed letters and words was unimpaired, but Turnbull
and McCarthy [2] account for this, quite reasonably, by
suggesting that, over time, mirror-image letters acquire the
status of separate objects — that b and d, for example,
become encoded as objects in their own right. Of course, it
would not make sense to do the same for different views of
our acquaintances. If Turnbull and McCarthy’s account
were correct, then the types of process required in enantio-
morph discrimination should be localized to the parietal
cortex. This is precisely what has been observed directly in
a recent study [15] of human subjects performing mental
rotation tasks in which they were asked to compare objects
from different viewpoints and decide whether they were
identical or enantiomorphs. Using functional magnetic
resonance imaging, increases in focal blood flow were
observed the during mental rotation in cortical areas 7a and
7b, the regions one would expect to be concerned with this
process. Similar observations were made earlier using
event-related potential recordings [16].
The rarity of occasions on which we have to discriminate
enantiomorphs may make one wonder about their signifi-
cance — after all, it is not every day that one is troubled
by being required to remember the orientation of a paint-
ing. Nevertheless, studies of how the brain handles mirror
images promise to provide significant insights into the way
that discrete functional modules are organized in the
visual cortex and, in particular, the contribution of the
parietal cortex to object recognition.
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